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Abstract  Card payments are getting more and more popular across the world. The dominant
standard used for Electronic Funds Transfer transaction is EMV. It is widely used across Europe
and Canada, and currently it is being introduced in the USA. The most frequently used Cardholder
Verication Method in EMV transaction is PIN, which requires from the payment terminal to be
equipped with pinpad which increases the cost of the whole payment device. In this article I present
an alternative Cardholder Verication Method (CVM) that can be used instead of traditional PIN.
The key advantage of the presented mechanism is that it can be easily implemented in currently
utilized authorization protocols, it does not aect rules of EMV specication and may decrease time
of transaction processing.
1 Introduction
Smart cards have almost completely replaced traditional magstripe cards, but not in
the USA. Magstripe cards are still very popular there, which has direct impact on level
of frauds. It is the only region in the world, where volume of counterfeit card frauds
is constantly growing [1]. Because of this kind of frauds, the USA issuers accounted
for over 26% of global fraud losses in 2013. This is the main reason why there is
very high pressure from banks to introduce EMV in the USA. As we can imagine,
the whole process will be very costly, so there are still contentious discussions how to
make this transition and how the technology standard will be implemented in the PoS
(Point of Sale) [2]. There are several obstacles to be overcome. Americans are used to
making the transactions with the magstripe card veried by signature, and probably
it will be hard for them to get used to paying by chip card and entering the PIN
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code. Luckily, EMV specication allows to verify a cardholder via the signature. On
the other hand, switching to EMV will dramatically increase costs of payment system
maintenance. Whereas the cost of a single magstripe card is about $0.25, the cost of a
smart card can vary from $1.25 to $2.50, depending on card capabilities [2]. The setup
of the whole EMV-based payment system will also be very expensive. The cost of the
standard magstripe reader is about $20, while a smart card reader can cost about $40
(without pinpad), and can run up to $100 for those equipped with pinpad [2]. The cost
of pinpad is so high because such device must be compliant with various strict security
standards like PCI DSS [3]. As we may see, it is worth resigning from introducing
pinpads at points of sales in new installations. Such approach will dramatically reduce
costs of the whole payment system and will speed up rollout of EMV based solutions.
The key issue is how to resign from pinpads and do not decrease level of transaction
security this can be achieved by utilizing the context-based security management
approach [17, 20, 22, 24]. In this paper I propose new Customer Verication Method
that is based on one time codes entered in the standard keyboard (or any other input
device), that is not the PCI DSS compliant because it would not handle sensitive data.
The decision to perform Cardholder Verication or not will be made dynamically by
the central authorization system that analyzes various context factors gathered from
history and present transaction details. The presented approach can even increase
transaction security and reduce average transaction processing time.
2 Payment System Architecture
Fig. 1. Payment system architecture four-party card scheme
The standard four-party card scheme is depicted in Fig. 1. Each party can be
described as follows:
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• Cardholder a person who wants to buy some goods or services and pays by
card,
• Merchant a person who sells goods or services and operates payment terminal
to accept card transactions,
• Acquirer an institution that processes payment transaction. It is forwarding
the authorization request to the Issuer and sends authorization response back
to the terminal,
• Issuer its an institution (bank) that issued the Cardholders card. After
receiving the authorization request, it checks if the transaction can be au-
thorized by checking cardholders account balance and (in the case of EMV
transaction) by validating transaction cryptogram generated by the card. It
also generates the authorization response and sends it back to the Acquirer.
There are also some fees that are charged from the transaction amount:
• Merchant Service Charge,
• Interchange Fees (IC Fees) can vary from the transaction type and circum-
stances under which the transaction has been performed (if there was a fall-
back to magstripe or not etc.).
The communication between Acquirer and Issuer is processed via MasterCard, Visa or
other card company network (depends on what card was used). The communication
between Acquirer and Merchants terminal is performed via special authorization proto-
col and depends on the Acquirer. More information about the authorization protocols
can be found in Section 3.
3 Authorization Protocols
The authorization protocol is used in order to communicate between Merchants
terminal and Acquirer. It is mainly used for:
• Exchanging authorization requests,
• Performing settlement usually at the end of day,
• Performing network diagnostics,
• Transferring conguration to the terminal.
For instance, the most popular authorization protocol in Poland is ISO 8583. Its
customized versions are used for example by:
• Elavon one of the most popular acquirer in Europe and USA
• eService the biggest Polish acquirer, currently exploring European countries
Short description of this protocol can be found in Section 3.1. The other, known for
the author, authorization protocols are:
• SPDH used for example by FirstData Poland,
• EP2 the most popular protocol in Swiss and neighboring countries, used for
example by SIX Payments Services.
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3.1 ISO 8583
The whole standard is dened in ISO 8583 Financial transaction card originated
messages Interchange message specications. It is the binary protocol dened by
International Organization of Standardization and intended for the systems that ex-
change electronic transactions made by cardholders using payment cards. ISO 8583
denes a communication ow and a message format so that dierent systems can ex-
change these transaction requests and responses [5]. Fig. 1 presents the structure of
ISO 8583 message.
Fig. 2. Structure of ISO 8583 message
MTI Message type indicator is a 4 digit numeric eld which denes the high level
function of the message. MTI includes the ISO 8583 version, the Message Class, the
Message Function and the Message Origin. For example MTI equal to 0100 means:
• 0xxx - version of ISO 8583 (1987 version),
• x1xx - Authorization Message,
• xx0x Request,
• xxx0 Acquirer.
Detailed description of MTI can be found in [5].
Bitmap eld indicates which data elements are present in the other part of the
message. For example: Bitmap equal to 4210001102C04804 indicates that elds 2,
7, 12, 28, 32, 39, 41, 42, 50, 53, 62 will be present in the message, because 0x42 =
01000010, so bits 2 and 7 are set in byte 1 etc.
After bitmap each eld carries transaction information. The main elds in ISO 8583
messages are as follows:
• 4 Transaction amount,
• 7 Transaction date and time,
• 11 Transaction sequence number,
• 35 Track2 data,
• 39 Response code,
• 64 Message Authentication code.
There are also some elds (61-63) reserved for private usage. They are usually utilized
by Acquirers for:
• Value Added Services,
• Time Synchronization,
• Stocktaking.
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Those private elds can be utilized for the presented new Cardholder Verication
Method in order to send one time code to the terminal.
4 EMV Security Mechanisms
The EMV standard (named after Europay, Visa and MasterCard) introduced many
security mechanisms that rapidly decreased volume of fraudulent transactions. In fact,
the goal of introducing EMV was to shift the costs of dispute from the issuing bank in
the following way:
• If a disputed transaction has been authorized by a signature, it would be
charged to the merchant,
• If a disputed transaction has been authorized by a PIN then it would be
charged to the customer.
It other words, the banking industry, which designed the whole system, carries less
liability for the fraud. This is also called the liability shift [6].
4.1 EMV Transaction Steps
Each EMV transaction consists of several processing steps:
• Application Selection each smart card can have a few payment applications
available. Application may be selected manually by the cardholder from the
displayed list, or may be selected automatically by the terminal the decision
is made based on priorities assigned to each application,
• Application Initialization the terminal sends certain information to the card
in order to decide if transaction processing should be continued. If yes, then
the card responds to its processing capabilities (AIP) and application le
location (AFL), indicating from where to read application data,
• Application Data Read in this step the terminal reads application data from
location pointed by AFL. The terminal retrieves all data necessary to perform
payment transaction. Card controls data that can be read for example it is
not possible to read PIN value. In other words it is not possible to clone a
smart card
• Card Data Authentication this step is intended to verify if the presented card
in not a counterfeit one. All possible methods to be performed in this step
were described in Section 4.2,
• Processing Restrictions the terminal checks if the requested service is allowed,
if the application has not expired etc.,
• Cardholder Verication the terminal veries if the person who presents the
card is the genuine cardholder. The whole Cardholder Verication step is
described in detail in Section 4.3,
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• Terminal Risk Management during this step the terminal can decide if the
transaction should go online or not. The decision is made based on the trans-
action amount (if the so called oor limit were exceeded), transaction history
(how many transactions has been authorized oine before) etc.,
• Terminal Action Analysis the result of the previous steps is saved in the
so called Terminal Verication Result TVR. It is a bitmap that stores var-
ious information for example if the application is expired, if the oor limit
is exceeded etc. Its value is compared with Terminal Action Codes (TAC
retrieved from the terminal conguration), and IAC (Issuer Action Codes re-
trieved from the card). This comparison can indicate that the transaction
should be oine declined, oine approved, or must go online. The result is
sent to the card in the GENERATE AC command which requests from the
card to generate the application cryptogram. Possible cryptogram types are
described in Section 5,
• Card Action Analysis in this step the card performs its own issuer specic
analysis. The card can change the terminal decision only to a stricter one.
The card decision is indicated by the type of cryptogram generated in response
for GENERATE AC command,
• Online Processing this step is performed only if the generated cryptogram
was Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC). In that case the generated
cryptogram is sent to the issuer host for authorization. The issuer sends
back its Authorization Response Cryptogram (ARPC) which is forwarded to
the card in order to make a nal authorization decision. Even if the host
authorized the transaction, the card can decline it if it failed to authenticate
the received cryptogram,
• Issuer Script Processing this step is optional and is performed only when the
issuer sends its script with the authorization response. Such scripts allow to
update the card data, for example unlock or change the PIN code, block the
card etc.
As can be seen, the EMV standard species a lot of security mechanisms that drive
transaction processing in a certain way. The whole Risk Management and the Action
Analysis procedures are performed on the terminal and card side, so only a few context
factors can be taken into account. The presented approach assumes that the key Risk
Management processing is performed on the issuer host side, so a lot of context factors
can be freely analyzed and a more accurate decision can be made.
4.2 Card Authentication Methods
All card authentication methods (CAM) provided by the EMV standard are based
on the asymmetric cryptography - RSA. There are three possible card authentication
methods to be performed during the EMV transaction:
• SDA Static Data Authentication - requires the merchant terminal to verify
the digital signature of static card data computed by the issuer. The SDA
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cards are not able to perform the RSA calculation, so they are cheap, but this
type of cards is vulnerable to a trivial and well-known replay attack in which
the certicate is read from a card and written to a counterfeit one (these
are often called yes cards because they will respond yes to any entered PIN
during the PIN verication phase) [6],
• DDA Dynamic Data Authentication in this method the terminal veries
a dynamic digital signature generated by the card over the unpredictable
number sent by the terminal. As this algorithm is dynamic, it is better than
SDA but it also requires that the card has an RSA private key along with the
RSA processing capability so those cards are more expensive than the SDA
ones [7],
• CDA -Combined Data Authentication - this method can be performed on
the cards supporting DDA, and assumes that the terminal veries a digital
signature computed by the card over the full transaction data (including the
symmetric cryptogram that can be veried by the issuer). CDA is better than
DDA because CDA protects against the use of so-called wedges that, if un-
detected, could fraudulently modify the transaction data exchanged between
the card and the terminal.
4.3 Cardholder Verication Method
During the EMV card personalization each card is equipped with the so-called CVM
List. This list presents the issue choice of supported CVMs ordered by priority. This
list also indicates what should happen if this failed to perform the current CVMmethod
to go to the next CVM from the list, to decline the transaction etc. Because dierent
types of terminals support dierent CVMs, multiple CVMs enable the EMV card to
be accepted at as many merchant terminals as possible. The card and the terminal use
the rst matching CVM type for transaction authorization [8].
There are a few possible Cardholder Verication Methods dened by the EMV stan-
dard:
• Oine Plaintext PIN in this case PIN is entered on the pinpad and sent
directly to the card in the plaintext form. Then the card responds if PIN is
correct or not. Such PIN number is not send to the authorization host. It is
worth mentioning that if this failed to verify Oine PIN then the terminal
can switch to another CVM method regarding the CVM List,
• Oine Enciphered PIN this method is similar to Oine Plaintext PIN, but
PIN is submitted to the card enciphered under the card public key. This
type of CVM can be performed only by cards supporting DDA because of
mandatory RSA calculation,
• Online PIN in this method PIN is entered on the pinpad and sent directly to
the authorization host in authorization request. The PIN is validated by the
issuer and proper response is sent to the terminal. PIN is encrypted using
3DES with the (usually) unique key per each transaction. In order to derive
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the unique key, a few key management schemes like DUKPT [9] or Mas-
ter/Session have been proposed. There are also proprietary key management
schemes like for example in EP2 [10],
• Signature This Cardholder Verication Method is performed always after
online of oine authorization. In this case the merchant veries if the sig-
nature on the transaction receipt matches that on the card. If the merchant
arms that the signature is not valid, the automatic reversal for the current
transaction is generated and the decline receipt is printed on the terminal.
This CVM method can be only performed on the attended terminals,
• NoCVM in this case, the transaction is authorized without the PIN or the
signature. It is usually utilized for low-amount transactions, and it is the
fastest way to complete the transaction.
As mentioned before, Cardholder Verication Method during the EMV transaction
is agreed by the terminal in cooperation with the card. In the EMV terminal cong-
uration there is a special parameter called the CVM limit. This parameter indicates
the amount of transaction above which it cannot be authorized with NoCVM. In
particular, if this parameter is set to 0, every transaction will require a kind of PIN or
signature. There are also terminals (usually unattended ones) that require NoCVM
for every transaction because they are not equipped with pinpad and there is no
merchant to validate the signature.
Non implemented Cardholder Verication Methods Recently researchers
have focused on introducing the biometric-based Cardholder Verication Methods
[15, 16]. As smart cards are getting more and more powerful such approach is quite
reasonable. Those methods assume that during the Cardholder Verication step some
biometric data will be gathered from the Cardholder, converted to a special format and
sent to the card for validation. The following biometric information can be veried:
• Fingerprint
• Face shape
• Voice
• Signature dynamics
• Iris pattern
• Hand geometry
• Keystroke
Unfortunately, none of those Cardholder Verication Methods have been implemented
in real payment system. This can happen because of high costs of biometric devices.
4.4 Attacks on EMV Security
In 2010 a group of researchers from Cambridge proved that stolen cards can be
successfully used without knowing PIN code [6]. It can happen only when Oine PIN
is used. In that case after PIN is entered, the Verify command is sent to the card. Card
simply responds with OK or NOK answer, that is not tied to any data nor secured
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by any signature. An attack assumes that the whole communication between the card
and the terminal is routed via the proxy device that blocks the Verify command and
always responds with OK to the terminal. In that situation the terminal thinks that
Oine PIN was performed, and the card thinks that NoCVM was forced.
Another interesting attack was proposed by Adam Laurie, Andrea Barisani, Daniele
Bianco and Zac Franken and it is called the CVM Downgrade attack [11]. This attack
assumes that the CVM List sent by the card is changed by the proxy device in order to
force the Oine PIN verication. Such change may cause Oine Data Authentication
to fail, but they proved that it may not lead to decline the transaction (because they
have also changed IAC Issuer Action Codes 1). Moreover, in most cases such modied
transaction will be successfully authorized by the Issuer.
5 Proposed Solution
Nowadays almost everyone has its own mobile phone and always carries it in his
pocket. Mobile phones are used not only for texting and voice call, but also for example
for authentication. One time passwords sent via SMS or generated from the dedicated
application are currently very frequently used for conrmation of online fund transfers.
The presented approach assumes that the transaction is conrmed by entering one
time code if the issuers system decides to perform Customer Verication. The whole
diagram of transaction that involves the new Context-based Cardholder Verication
Method is depicted in Fig. 3.
The transaction ow can be described as follows:
• Payment terminal is congured to accept only NoCVM transactions,
• After the amount and card entry steps, the transaction process regarding the
NoCVM rules. The results of such processing can be:
 Oine Approved Transaction Certicate (TC) has been generated by
the card,
 Oine Decline - Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC) has
been generated by the card,
 Request for online authorization Authorization Request Cryptogram
(ARQC) has been generated by the card,
• Let us assume that the card requested for online authorization. In that case
Authorization Request is generated by the terminal and sent via the Acquirer
to the Issuer,
• The Issuer checks if the card is active, sucient funds are present on the
Cardholders account and if the ARQC cryptogram is genuine. If any of those
conditions fail, the transaction is declined and the proper Authorization Re-
quest is sent back to the terminal,
1More information about EMV processing can be found in [13] and [14]
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Fig. 3. Transaction ow diagram involving Context-based Cardholder
Verication Method
• Let us assume that checks from the previous step went OK. Next, the Issuer
runs its risk management algorithm to decide if the transaction can be autho-
rized with NoCVM, or if one time code entry will be required. The algorithm
can take into account the following context factors:
 Amount of transaction,
 Time of transaction,
 Point of Sale localization,
 Cardholder transaction history,
 Cardholder reputation (if there were some disputes in the past).
• If the Issuer decides to authorize the transaction without CVM, then the
standard Authorization Response is sent back to the terminal,
• If the Issuer decides to use one time code verication, then a proper code is
sent somehow (i.e. in the private eld 61 ISO 8583 protocol message) to the
terminal and at the same time delivered to the Cardholders mobile device,
• When the terminal receives such Authorization Response, it prompts the
cardholder to enter its one time code on the standard keyboard, touchscreen,
or any non-secure input device,
• If the entered code matches the received one in Authorization Response, the
transaction is nally accepted,
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:49:39
UM
CS
56 One-Time Code Cardholder Verication Method in...
• If the entered code does not match the received one in Authorization Re-
sponse, the terminal generates the oine reversal of current transaction, and
the cardholder receives the printout of the declined transaction.
5.1 Security Analysis
In the presented approach the processed transaction is fully compliant with the EMV
standard, it means that:
• Card authentication is veried,
• In the case of Contact EMV card, the issuer authentication is veried.
Moreover, our approach is not prone to attacks described in chapter 5.3 because:
• It prevents from using Oine PIN,
• It utilizes the less secure CVM dened by EMV, so the CVM List downgrade
attack is not applicable.
The behaviour of payment terminal during one time code verication will be similar
to that during the signature check, it means that:
• If one time code is invalid, then the transaction is automatically declined,
• If there is a cut in the power supply on one time code verication step, the
non-veried transaction will be automatically reversed just after the next
terminal boot.
What is more, the signature verication is prone to accidental acceptance (because
there is only simple question: Is signature valid? with possible answers YES or NO). In
our approach, one time code is only known by the terminal application, so the only way
to accept the transaction is to enter valid one time code. Also communication between
the terminal and the Acquirer is secured usually with TLS, so there is no chance to
eavesdrop on one time code during the transmission.
Paradoxically, our solution can increase security of low-amount transactions. Due to
the fact that the decision about CVM is made by the Issuer, fraudulent transactions
can be revealed earlier and CVM can be requested also for low-amount transaction
which is not possible in the standard EMV approach.
One time code can be delivered to the Cardholders device for example via:
• SMS,
• Dedicated application that will download one time code from the Issuers
server,
• Dedicated application that will generate RSA tokens.
In order to unlock mobile device usually there is a need to enter PIN code, draw special
pattern on the screen and so on. Because of that, in the case of stolen or lost device,
the security of the whole solution still holds high level. We must consider that in such
cases fraudulent transactions are possible only till the Cardholder blocks his card.
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6 Summary and Future Work
The key thing in introducing any change in such big systems as Payment Systems is
to utilize as many present mechanisms as it is possible. Introducing any big change does
not make sense because it will be not protable and will take a lot of time to rollout. In
this paper I presented the new Context-based Cardholder Verication Method which
can be easily adapted to the present Payment Systems and it utilizes mechanisms
provided by EMV specication. What is more, the presented CVM reduces costs of
payment devices (because it does not use a pinpad) which could be a real accelerator
for rollouts in new countries like the USA. Thanks to the risk management algorithm
running on the Issuer side, there is possibility to optimize the transaction processing
time ask for CVM only if there is real need to do so. The decision about CVM will
be made based on transaction context, so the result will be accurate.
Moreover, contrary to signature verication, the presented Cardholder Verication
Method can be used in unattended solutions, which are getting more and more popular
across the world. Such solutions are exposed to acts of vandalisms and hard weather
conditions, so in fact they are more expensive than the attended ones. Utilizing the
presented CVM method can also reduce price of unattended devices.
The next step in the future research could be design and validation of the risk man-
agement algorithm running on the Issuer side. It is also worth to prove, that currently
congured in the payment terminals CVM limit (equal to 50 PLN in Poland) could
be easily increased without major impact on the transaction security. Such approach
could allow to reduce average transaction processing time diametrically, because large
majority of authorized transactions have the amount less than 100 PLN.
Another interesting topic for future research could be deployment of one time codes.
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